We investigate whether reporting incentives influence income trusts' calculation and reporting of distributable cash, and whether investors see through distributable cash management. Using Standardized Distributable Cash as the starting point to the calculation of distributions, we split distributions in three components. Results suggest that income trusts use their discretion to overstate distributable cash when they would report a decrease in Standardized Distributable Cash, and when board ownership is higher. Income trusts that experience a decline in yield record higher over distributions, while income trusts with higher managerial equity incentives and higher board ownership record lower over distributions. Independent trustees constrain managers' ability to pay distributions higher than disclosed distributable cash. Finally, we find that Standardized Distributable Cash and abnormal distributable cash are valued positively, while over (under) distributions are valued negatively (positively). In our view, this finding substantiates the primacy of cash distributions in the valuation of income trusts, with management's use of discretion in the calculation of distributable cash making possible stability in that regard.
Introduction
Flow-through entities encompass many different legal structures. However, they usually share two key attributes. First, flow-through entities typically own mature assets that generate excess or free cash flows. Second, flow-through entities commit to distribute most of these cash flows to investors. In light of these attributes, flow-through entities have historically been popular investment vehicles in some industries such as oil and gas royalties or real estate (including lodging and hotels). In most cases, the entities will not pay income taxes or income will be taxable in investors' hands, thus eliminating the double taxation of corporate income, a major issue in some countries. However, irrespective of a potential tax advantage, flow-through entities also commit managers to disgorge most if not all of their free cash flows, thus potentially preventing them from making suboptimal investments, a policy that is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986 ).
This paper addresses three related questions that underlie flow-through entities' commitment to distribute most of their free cash flow to investors. First, what are managerial incentives underlying the measurement of distributable cash? Second, do managers actually engage in distributable cash management to modify actual cash distributions? Third, how do investors value such entities, i.e., how do they weigh alternative performance indicators and do they solely focus on actual cash distributions?
We investigate these questions in the context of Canadian income trusts, a type of flowthrough entity which arose from the real estate and oil and gas industries but which eventually migrated to most sectors of the Canadian economy. In contrast to corporations, which mandate, constitution and governance are set within the parameters of the Business Corporations Act, each income trust is a distinct legal entity, governed by a private trust deed, and so structured as to control an underlying operating company or a set of income generating assets. The trust's key focus is to maximize its periodic cash distributions to unitholders so that it does not retain any excess cash. Rating agencies also publish stability ratings to help in assessing the stability of future distributions. 2 A trust that either cuts or suspends distributions is called a "fallen angel"
because the announcement often results in a large decrease in unit price. Moreover, the yield demanded by investors generally increases with the risk of a cut or suspension in distributions. In light of investors' fixation on cash distributions, income trusts have strong incentives to maintain a stable or increasing trend in distributions from year to year, possibly in a way that is detrimental to long term value creation.
Our investigation of these concerns involves the following steps. First, we investigate the determinants of abnormal distributable cash. We expect income trusts that would otherwise report a decrease in Standardized Distributable Cash from the previous year, income trusts with higher managerial equity incentives and those with higher board ownership to record higher abnormal distributable cash, i.e. overstate disclosed distributable cash. Since a higher proportion of independent trustees on the board should limit income trusts managers' ability to manipulate the distributable cash figure, we also expect income trusts with a higher proportion of independent trustees on the board to record lower abnormal distributable cash. Our results suggest that income trusts use their discretion to overstate distributable cash when they would otherwise report a decrease in Standardized Distributable Cash, and when board ownership is higher.
Second, we examine the determinants of over (under) distributions. On one hand, we expect income trusts that would report a decrease in disclosed distributable cash to record higher over distributions. On the other hand, we expect income trusts with higher managerial equity incentives and board ownership to record lower over distributions to avoid a decrease in unit price. Similarly, we expect trusts with a higher proportion of independent trustees on the board to record lower over distributions. After controlling for the cash available to pay the distribution and the cumulative distributable cash reserve at the beginning of the period, we find that income trusts that experienced a decline in disclosed distributable cash from the previous year seem to record higher over distributions, but that income trusts with higher managerial equity incentives and higher board ownership record lower over distributions. Our results also seem to indicate that independent trustees constrain managers' ability to pay distributions higher than disclosed distributable cash to protect unit value. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Vincent, 1999; Fields, Rangan and Thiagarajan, 1998) . In contrast, income trusts comprise firms from almost all industrial sectors and rely on unique legal and financial structures (Halpern and Norli, 2006) . In addition, while U.S. REITs' non-GAAP reporting is standardized at the industry level, such is not the case for Canadian income trusts.
Second, income trusts allow for an investigation of corporate financial and reporting decisions within a context in which legal and governance structures as well as reporting practices are subject to few standards. Within such a context, our findings show the tight integration between managerial financial incentives, financial reporting, cash distributions and stock market valuations.
Third, the paper provides further evidence on the role of governance in corporate decision-making, especially financial reporting and dividend distributions. Our evidence is consistent with corporate governance being effective in attenuating managerial influence and, thereby, enhancing the quality of financial reporting and the reliability of cash distributions.
Finally, the paper provides evidence that the valuation of firms for which the focus is the maximization of cash distributions relies extensively on the extent of such distributions and does not completely adjust for the sustainability of such distributions.
Such findings are consistent with prior evidence that dividends and dividend changes provide information that is potentially value relevant. However, it appears that investors do not completely apprehend the sustainability of future cash distributions in their assessment of income trust values. These findings bring further insights into the debate about the need and usefulness to standardize financial reporting. Moreover, in contrast to previous papers interested in the value-relevance and information content of alternative performance measures in the real estate investment trust (REIT) industry (e.g. Gore and Stott, 1998; Vincent, 1999; Graham and Knight, 2000) , we decompose cash distributions into their discretionary and non-discretionary components and examine the valuerelevance of each component separately for a sample of income trusts from a variety of industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional environment in which income trusts are evolving. Research propositions are developed in Section 3. The method is presented in Section 4. Results are discussed in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the paper's contributions.
Background

Income Trusts and their Institutional Environment
An income trust is a legal entity structured to hold equity and interest-bearing debt from an underlying operating company that operates a business (e.g. public, restaurants, consumer product companies and manufacturing companies) or holds a set of income generating assets (e.g. real estate, oil and gas properties, and mining properties).
The operating company might be a private company that decides to raise financing through an income trust vehicle in a manner similar to a traditional IPO; a private or public company that decides to spin off part of its business into an income trust; or a public company that decides to convert its common shares into trust units without any new financing (Jog and Wang, 2004) . The income trust is legally required to distribute any money generated to its unitholders. To maximize periodic cash distributions to unitholders, the trust ideally owns mature assets that require little ongoing capital expenditures, face little competition and provide a predictable stream of cash flows (King, 2003 ) (see Figure 1 ).
{Insert Figure 1 here} Income trusts differ from regular corporations because they are a flow-through structure that allows income to be taxed at the investor level only. Interest payments to the income trust reduce the operating company's taxable income and minimize corporate taxes at the operating company level. The income trust then distributes the interest earned to unitholders and claims a deduction on its taxable income for the distributions, to achieve the goal of distributing all taxable income for the year. Finally, investors tax themselves on the distributions according to their individual circumstances. Therefore, they can receive a higher level of cash distribution than is possible when the same assets are held by a corporation (King, 2003) . & Poor's, 2007b) . Therefore, the evidence to date seems to suggest that it is too early to conclude on their quick disappearance from the capital markets.
The market value of an income trust largely depends on its ability to maximize and maintain cash distributions. Income trusts have a median distribution of 87% of cash flow from operations as compared to a median distribution of 7% of cash flow from operations for comparable corporations (Halpern and Norli, 2003) . To assess the value and performance of income trusts, investors and financial analysts examine the level and stability of past cash distributions and forecast future distributions. Rating agencies also publish stability ratings to help in assessing the stability of future distributions.
Dominion Bond Rating Services' stability rating measures the stability and sustainability of cash distributions per fund unit over time (DBRS, 2004 
Distributable Cash
Cash distributions are contingent on a trust's available distributable cash.
Distributable cash generally refers to the net cash generated by the income trust's businesses or assets that is available for distribution, at the discretion of the income trust, to the unitholders (CSA, 2004 Release as well as how many will actually adopt the concept of Standardized Distributable Cash. However, the Interpretative Release provides a conceptual framework to assess income trusts' calculation and reporting practices prior to its adoption. The conceptual framework, as well as our research propositions, is discussed in the next section.
Conceptual Framework and Research Propositions
Conceptual Framework
In the absence of a standardized definition for distributable cash or specific requirements regarding its calculation and reporting, income trusts' managers can manipulate the distributable cash figure to appear to 1) pay a distribution that is lower or equal to distributable cash; and 2) maintain a stable or increasing trend in distributions.
The concept of Standardized Distributable Cash provides a standardized measure of distributable cash to assess the extent to which income trusts make use of the available discretion to reach these two objectives. and maintain a stable or increasing trend in distributions. Figure 2 illustrates the three components of the distribution for a trust that discloses a distributable cash figure higher than Standardized Distributable Cash, and pays a distribution lower than disclosed distributable cash. Figure 2 shows how a trust can overstate the distributable cash figure to give the impression of being conservative (i.e. paying a distribution lower than distributable cash) while actually paying a distribution higher than Standardized Distributable Cash, the real cash generated by the operating activities after capital expenditures. 4 In the next section, we discuss economic and governance factors that could explain such behaviour.
{Insert Figure 2 here} 
Determinants of Distribution Components
Smoothing
Prior research shows that regular corporations tend to engage in both earnings and dividend smoothing. Earnings smoothing occurs when the accounting components of earnings are managed to reduce the variability of reported earnings around some level considered normal for the firm (Bartov, 1993; Leuz et al., 2003) . Dividend smoothing occurs when the current dividend is largely influenced by the prior dividend, and relatively insensitive to current earnings (Aivazian et al., 2006) . Income trusts differ from regular corporations in that the assessment of the business is predicated on cash generation and availability for distribution as opposed to earnings (Standard and Poor's, 2006a). As such, the smoothed figures are more likely to be disclosed distributable cash and cash distributions.
Given their incentive to show a stable or increasing trend in distributable cash and cash distributions, income trusts are more likely to overstate the disclosed distributable cash figure not to report a shortfall as compared to the previous year, than to understate a disclosed distributable cash figure that is larger than the previous year. trusts with a decrease in disclosed distributable cash will record higher over distributions.
Managerial Equity Incentives
Increased use of stock-based compensation along with other equity incentives over the past decade have raised concerns they may persuade managers to increase shortterm stock prices in order to subsequently benefit from selling shares or exercising options (Cheng & Warfield, 2005) . Cheng and Warfield (2005) show there is a significantly higher incidence of meeting or just beating analyst forecasts for firms with higher managerial equity incentives. Lev (1992) suggests that in cases where managers have incentives to manage stock price, they will choose to delay or accelerate the disclosure of bad and good news so that it moves in the desired direction. In other words, they will try to minimize stock price (and the exercise price) when stock options are granted, and maximize it when the options can be exercised. 5 Finally, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2005) show that managers are likely more sensitive to a 5 Empirical studies generally support the stock price management hypothesis. Yermack (1997) finds that stock options are generally granted shortly before higher than expected quarterly earnings are announced, and followed by favourable stock price movements. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that unfavourable (favourable) stock movements generally occur before (after) stock options are granted. They also find that the granting of stock options is preceded by negative but insignificant abnormal returns and followed by positive and significant abnormal returns, consistent with managers accelerating (delaying) the announcement of bad (good) news prior to the granting.
decrease in the value of their options when they are not only exercisable with a profit (inthe-money), but also when the existing profit is important compared to their wealth (that is, deep in-the-money).
Managers' decisions with respect to disclosed distributable cash can negatively impact unit price if there is a decreasing trend in distributable cash (that leads to a decrease in distributions), or the distribution ends up being higher than distributable cash (i.e. partly a return of capital). To avoid a decrease in unit price, managers of trusts with higher equity incentives would then have an incentive to overstate disclosed distributable cash and minimize over distributions. If such is the case, trusts with higher managerial equity incentives will record higher abnormal distributable cash. They will record lower over distributions.
Board Ownership
To align the interests of directors with those of shareholders, regulators and governance activists (e.g. the Coalition for Good Governance) recommend that directors have a significant investment in the shares of the entities they govern. However, the increase in shareholdings also increases the importance of insider trading to directors (Ronen et al., 2006) . Hence, Ronen et al. (2006) show that directors with higher shareholdings allow managers to manage earnings in order to engage in profitable insider trading. The desire to make profitable insider trades leads directors to create an information asymmetry between themselves and the market. As such, they prefer earnings management that conceals the truth.
If unit ownership makes trustees more sensitive to changes in unit price and leads them to support managerial opportunism that results in higher unit prices, then trustees with higher ownership will let managers overstate disclosed distributable cash. However, they will avoid distributions in excess of disclosed distributable cash. If such is the case, trusts with higher director ownership will record higher abnormal distributable cash.
They will record lower over distributions.
Board Independence
Even though income trusts' managers may have incentives to take advantage of the lack of standards to manipulate the distributable cash figure, their ability to do so ultimately depends upon the constraints they face. One such constraint is the scrutiny of the board of trustees. The board of directors (trustees) must promote accurate, high quality and timely disclosure of financial and other material information to the public markets, and to shareholders (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999 ). An important function of the board of directors (trustees) is also to minimize agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control i.e. to ensure that management is working in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders to enhance corporate economic value (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Independence of the board members is judged critical to ensuring that they fulfill their oversight role and hold management accountable to shareholders. Independent directors are generally considered better monitors because they have the ability to act with a view of the best interests of the corporation (Toronto Stock Exchange, 1994). They also have incentives to develop a reputation as experts in decision control and monitoring to maintain the value of their human capital (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) .
Prior empirical research on the relationship between the extent of earnings management and board of directors' independence generally support the hypothesis that independent directors effectively constrain more or less severe cases of earnings management. A first line of research shows that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board reduces the probability of a company restating its earnings (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) ; the likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996) ; and the probability of being the object of a SEC enforcement action (Dechow et al., 1996) . A second stream of literature finds that a higher percentage of independent directors reduces the likelihood of belonging to a high discretionary accruals group (Bedard et al., 2004) ; and the level of discretionary accruals (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003) .
Overstating disclosed distributable cash can misguide investors about the nature (i.e. return on capital vs. return of capital) and the sustainability of cash distributions and result in misinformed investment decisions. Thus, a higher proportion of independent trustees on the board should limit income trusts managers' ability to manipulate the distributable cash figure. If such is the case, then income trusts with a higher proportion of independent trustees on the board will record lower abnormal distributable cash.
Independent trustees should also limit managers' ability to declare a distribution higher than disclosed distributable cash to protect unit value. If such is the case, then trusts with a higher proportion of independent trustees on the board will record lower over distributions.
Valuation of Distribution Components
Our next research question is whether investors see through distributable cash management, i.e. whether and how they value the three components of cash distributions.
It can be inferred that the nature and purpose of income trusts leads to the establishment of a strong implicit contract between income trusts' trustees and managers and their owners with respect to cash distributions. However, the unregulated nature of distributable cash reported by income trusts, which provides their managers with more discretion, as well as the institutional importance of cash distributions are bound to affect their value relevance.
Prior theoretical work (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) and empirical evidence (Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983 ) document the potential information content of dividends. Prior research also shows that a decision by a firm to change its dividend provides investors with a credible signal about its future prospects. In other words, a change in dividends is a benchmark that adds credibility to reported earnings. Sivakumar and Waymire (1993) as well as Cormier et al. (2000) document that in an environment with few mandatory disclosure requirements or restrictions on accounting methods, dividends and dividend changes are value-relevant to a greater extent than reported earnings. Furthermore, Cormier et al. (2000) show that discretionary accruals can actually be more valued than non-discretionary accruals in a dividendfocused environment such as Switzerland. This suggests that investors will value positively both standardized and abnormal distributable cash if abnormal distributable cash allows income trusts to maintain their cash distributions. However, if the cash distribution exceeds disclosed distributable cash, then the over distribution component should be negatively valued as it constitutes a return of capital.
Method
Sample and Data
Sample income trusts are drawn from Investcom (www.investcom.com). 
Models and Variables
Determinants of Abnormal Distributable Cash
The following pooled regression model is used to examine the determinants of abnormal distributable cash: arising from the existence of a minority interest in a subsidiary. Distributions paid to minority unitholders for year t are used to proxy for the limitations arising from the existence of a minority interest in a subsidiary.
DEVSTDDCASH measures income trusts' incentives to overstate disclosed distributable cash in order to maintain a constant or increasing level of distributable cash from year to year. Accordingly, we expect DEVSTDDCASH to be positively related to abnormal distributable cash. We use two proxies for managerial equity incentives: 1) the average percentage of their compensation that is paid in stock options (PEROPTIONS) and 2) the average value of the in-the-money options they hold in proportion to their annual compensation (ITMOPTIONS). We expect PEROPTIONS and ITMOPTIONS to be positively related to abnormal distributable cash. BODOWN measures board ownership. We expect BODOWN to be positively related to abnormal distributable cash.
Finally, BODINDEP is the percentage of independent trustees on the board. We expect BODINDEP to be negatively related to abnormal distributable cash.
Two control variables are included in the model (OWN, SIZE).
We control for ownership because prior research shows that reporting incentives of closely-held firms tend to differ (Hogler & Hunt, 1993) . Firm size is included as a control variable to proxy for various aspects of the income trust.
Determinants of Over (Under) Distributions
The following pooled regression model is used to examine the determinants of over (under) distributions: 
Where : EXCDISTR = Distribution for year t -disclosed distributable cash for year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of the year t CASH = Cash and cash equivalents at the end of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t CUMRESERVE = Cumulative distributable cash reserve at the beginning of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t DEVDCASH = 1 if disclosed distributable cash for year t is lower than disclosed distributable cash for year t-1; 0 otherwise PEROPTIONS = Average percentage of the top paid executives' compensation paid in options for the year t. ITMOPTIONS = Average value of "in the money" stock options held by the top paid executives at the end of year t divided by their total compensation for year t BODOWN = Total number of units owned by the trustees at the end of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t BODINDEP = Percentage of outsiders on the board of trustees for year t, as disclosed in the trust's proxy statement OWN = 1 if an external unitholder controls more than 10 percent of outstanding votes at the end of year t (i.e. the trust is closelyheld); 0 otherwise Finally, BODINDEP is the percentage of independent trustees on the board.
We expect BODINDEP to be negatively related to EXCDISTR.
Two control variables are included in the model (OWN, SIZE).
Valuation of Distribution Components
The following pooled regression is used to examine the value-relevance of distribution components, incremental to book value:
Where: This trend is consistent with the increased use of the income trust structure over the period studied.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
{Insert Table 1 here}   Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models. Table 2 ($1.1122) of liabilities for each dollar of equity. However, this high level of debt is necessary to be able to deduct the interest paid by the operating company to the trust and minimize corporate taxes at the operating company level; and to maximize cash distributions to unitholders at the trust level. Finally, the median (average) unit price is $12.55 ($14.13) and the median (average) book value per unit is $8.33 ($8.08).
{Insert Table 2 here}   Table 3 distribution is consistent with the difference between disclosed distributable cash and cash distributions being a significant driver of unit price. Standardized Distributable Cash and abnormal distributable cash are correlated by design.
{Insert Table 3 here} Finally, Panel C shows that the use of Standardized Distributable Cash as the benchmark measure leads to the reclassification of 67.5% of the trusts with a distribution lower than disclosed distributable cash as compared to only 10% of the trusts with a distribution higher than disclosed distributable cash. Overall, consistent with Table 2 , this suggests that income trusts take advantage of the available discretion to overstate disclosed distributable cash, and that the overstatement allows them to mislead investors as to the nature of the distribution they receive.
{Insert Table 4 here} Table 5 presents the results of the pooled regression examining the determinants of abnormal distributable cash. All reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. The model is significant (p < 0.000) with a R 2 of 31.07%. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on DEVSTDDCASH is positive and significant (p < 0.000).
Multivariate Results
This seems to suggest that income trusts use their discretion to overstate distributable cash and avoid reporting a decrease in distributable cash and cash distributions. Also consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on BODOWN is positive and significant (p < 0.041). Thus, it would seem that unit ownership makes trustees more sensitive to changes in unit price and leads them to support managerial opportunism in the form of overstated disclosed distributable cash. Managers of trusts with higher equity incentives do not seem to have an incentive to overstate disclosed distributable cash to avoid a decrease in unit price, as PEROPTIONS is negative and not significant (p < 0.598) and ITMOPTIONS is positive and not significant (p < 0.268). A higher proportion of independent trustees on the board also does not seem to constrain managers' ability to manipulate the distributable cash figure since the coefficient for BODINDEP is not significant (p < 0.495). None of the other coefficients are significant.
{Insert Table 5 here} Table 6 presents the results of the pooled regression examining the determinants of over (under) distributions. The model is significant (p < 0.000) with a R 2 of 43.99%.
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on CASH is positive, but marginally significant (p < 0.090). This seems to indicate that income trusts are more likely to pay a distribution higher than distributable cash if they have cash available to pay the distribution. The coefficient on CUMRESERVE is negative and significant (p < 0.000) as predicted. As such, CUMRESERVE seems to capture trusts' historical tendency to declare distributions lower or higher than disclosed distributable cash. The coefficients on OWN, SIZE and LEVERAGE are not significant.
Our results support all of our research propositions. DEVDCASH is positively associated with EXCDISTR, and the association is significant (p < 0.000). Thus, trusts seem more likely to pay a distribution higher than disclosed distributable cash if they experienced a decline in disclosed distributable cash from the previous year.
PEROPTIONS and ITMOPTIONS are negatively associated with EXCDISTR, and the association is marginally significant (p < 0.087 and p < 0.067). This suggests that managers with higher equity incentives avoid paying a distribution higher than disclosed distributable cash to protect unit price. BODOWN is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.086), consistent again with unit ownership making trustees more sensitive to a decrease in unit price and supportive of managerial opportunism. Finally, BODINDEP is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.089). This seems to indicate that independent trustees constrain managers' ability to pay distributions higher than disclosed distributable cash to protect unit value.
{Insert Table 6 here} After controlling for the cash available to pay the distribution and the cumulative distributable cash reserve at the beginning of the period, we find that income trusts that experienced a decline in disclosed distributable cash from the previous year seem to record higher over distributions, but that income trusts with higher managerial equity incentives and higher board ownership record lower over distributions. Our results also seem to indicate that independent trustees constrain managers' ability to pay distributions higher than disclosed distributable cash to protect unit value. Finally, we examine 
ITMOPTIONS
Average value of "in the money" stock options held by the top paid executives at the end of year t divided by their total compensation for year t BODOWN Total number of units owned by the trustees at the end of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t BODINDEP Percentage of outsiders on the board of trustees for year t, as disclosed in the trust's proxy statement OWN 1 if an external unitholder controls more than 10 percent of outstanding votes at the end of year t (i.e. the trust is closely-held); 0 otherwise SIZE Natural logarithm of lagged total assets TYPE Business, real estate, utility or resource trust as per Investcom's classification ***One-tailed if directional prediction, two-tailed otherwise. z-statistics based on robust standard errors. Distribution for year t -disclosed distributable cash for year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of the year t CASH Cash and cash equivalents at the end of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t CUMRESERVE Cumulative distributable cash reserve at the beginning of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t DEVDCASH 1 if disclosed distributable cash for year t is lower than disclosed distributable cash for year t-1; 0 otherwise PEROPTIONS Average percentage of the top paid executives' compensation paid in options for the year t.
Average value of "in the money" stock options held by the top paid executives at the end of year t divided by their total compensation for year t BODOWN Total number of units owned by the trustees at the end of year t scaled by the number of units outstanding at the end of year t BODINDEP Percentage of outsiders on the board of trustees for year t, as disclosed in the trust's proxy statement OWN 1 if an external unitholder controls more than 10 percent of outstanding votes at the end of year t (i.e. the trust is closely-held); 0 otherwise SIZE Natural logarithm of lagged total assets LEVERAGE Total liabilities at the end of year t divided by equity at the end of year t TYPE Business, real estate, utility or resource trust as per Investcom's classification ***One-tailed if directional prediction, two-tailed otherwise. z-statistics based on robust standard errors. 
